Proceedings of the Twenty-First ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP 2007), Stevenson, WA, October 2007.
James Hendricks, Gregory R. Ganger, Michael K. Reiter
Dept. Electrical and Computer Engineering
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
This paper presents an erasure-coded Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocol that is nearly as efficient as protocols that tolerate only crashes. Previous Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocols have either relied upon replication, which is inefficient for large blocks of data when tolerating multiple faults, or a combination of additional servers, extra computation, and versioned storage. To avoid these expensive techniques, our protocol employs novel mechanisms to optimize for the common case when faults and concurrency are rare. In the common case, a write operation completes in two rounds of communication and a read completes in one round. The protocol requires a short checksum comprised of cryptographic hashes and homomorphic fingerprints. It achieves throughput within 10% of the crash-tolerant protocol for writes and reads in failure-free runs when configured to tolerate up to 6 faulty servers and any number of faulty clients.
KEYWORDS: Performance, Reliability, Security, Byzantine fault-tolerant storage
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