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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Brian.Rubarts@born.com: RE: Storage over Ethernet/IP------- Forwarded Message Date: Fri, 26 May 2000 10:14:03 -0500 From: Brian.Rubarts@born.com To: moore@cs.utk.edu cc: ietf@ietf.org Subject: RE: Storage over Ethernet/IP >> Encryption will be offloaded to the network interface. ASICs on the NICs >> will greatly improve encryption and authentication performance. >all well and good, provided that this encryption and authentication >are actually compatible with that specified by higher level protocols >and the authentication actually meets the needs of users. >(if your network interface needs to use and verify users' credentials, >as opposed to the host's credentials, it might be a stretch.) A network server will still authenticate user requests. Only the host needs to be authenticated with the disk/disks. >> It won't run over the Internet because of latencies inherent on the >> public network. >at least for some storage applications, latency is not as important >as bandwidth. e.g. you can do backups over a high-latency medium >as long as your bandwidth is adequate (though recovery from write >errors gets a bit tricky). Backups could go through VPNs, I suppose. Good point. That would free your WAN of the backup jobs. I wasn't thinking of backups when I ruled out the Internet as a disk I/O medium. I suppose infrequently used and low priority files could also be accessed over the 'net. >> It will run over incredibly fast Packet over SONET Wide Area >> Networks--behind firewalls. >...it's >inappropriate to assume that it will always be used behind firewalls... If the larger network that is employing this technology doesn't hire a decent consultant, you might be right. If they do, it will ALWAYS be behind a firewall :-) >Firewalls don't help with the majority of security threats... True, but whether the server accesses the disks via SCSI over TCP or SCSI over Fibre Channel, the SERVER is still the weak link. The transport protocol doesn't create any inherent weaknesses of the type you are refering to--e-mail borne viruses, internal hackers, etc. The server would still be the attack point. Why goodness, the server and storage devices could be in a VLAN or something to deny direct hack attempts against the storage device, but the chink in the armor is how hardened is your OS? Brian ------- End of Forwarded Message
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