Re: security model

[julian_satran@il.ibm.com]

The subject is certainly interesting. The security chapters (login and
appendix) are getting
a fresh a look.  I assume that this is all WG will want to do for the first
version of iSCSI.  Integration in Storage Service Provider architecture is
certainly important and
and will continue to be handled after the first release.

Is this work related to Ocean Store?

Julo

Dave Nagle <bassoon@yogi.ece.cmu.edu> on 01/09/2000 16:38:11

Please respond to Dave Nagle <bassoon@yogi.ece.cmu.edu>

To:   ips@ece.cmu.edu
cc:    (bcc: Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM)
Subject:  security model




From: Banu Ozden & Mike Reiter

We suggest the attached extensions to the security model proposed in
the iSCSI draft (Section 6).

The existing iSCSI security model covers "communication security"
between an initiator and a target. It does not address "data
security".  Data security provides protection against possible attacks
to the data stored at the target. These include threats like
unauthorized disclosure of data at the target to administrators or
other clients of the target, and unauthorized modification of data at
the target.

Our main motivation is to enhance the security model for storage
outsourcing environments where the Storage Service Provider (SSP)
personnel is not necessarily trusted or where the sharing of target
between different customers of the SSP raises a security concern.

We are working on a security architecture for storage outsourcing.
We would like to know whether there is interest on including data
security considerations to iSCSI in addition to communication
security.



Banu Ozden & Mike Reiter


Bell Labs
600 Mountain Ave.
Murray Hill, NJ 07974
http://www.bell-labs.com/who/ozden
http://www.bell-labs.com/who/reiter



_______________________________________________________________
Threat Model

T1. Disclosure of message contents to an eavesdropper intercepting
    communication between an initiator and a target.

T2. An attacker masquerading as the initiator to a target or the target
    to an initiator. This includes an attacker manipulating communication
    between an initiator and a target, e.g., to introduce false messages,
    modify passing messages, or delete messages.

T3. Disclosure of data to personnel maintaining the target or to other
    customers of the target.

T4. The modification of data by the target or other customers of the
    target.



Security Model

1. No Security (same as described in the iSCSI draft)

     This mode does not authenticate nor does it encrypt data. This mode
     should be used in environments where there is minimal security risk
     and little chance for configuration errors.


2. Entity Authentication (referred to as End-to-End Authentication in the
   iSCSI draft)

     The initiator's and/or target's identity is authenticated.
     Once the client is authenticated, all messages are
     sent and received in the clear.  This mode should only be used when
     there is minimal risk to man-in-the-middle attacks,
     eavesdropping, message insertion, deletion, and modification.


3. Message Integrity (new)

     This mode protects against T2 types of threats. It provides
     communication integrity.

4. Message Integrity Combined with Encryption (referred to as Encryption in
   the iSCSI draft)

     This mode protects against threats T1 and T2. Thus, it provides
     communication integrity and communication privacy. It protects against
     man-in-the-middle attacks, eavesdropping, message insertion, deletion,
     and modification.

5. Data Privacy (new)

     This mode protects against T3 types of threats. The initiator
     encrypts/decrypts data. The target stores encrypted data.


6. Data Privacy with Data Integrity

     This mode protects against threats T3 and T4.

7. Some combinations of the above security options

   For example, data privacy with message authentication (5 & 3)
   protects against threats T1, T2 and  T3.