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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: iSCSI CONNECT messageJoshua, I'm confused. At the end of the note you say that my condition (A) "an initiator can ALWAYS open a connection to a target through normal TCP/IP mechanisms" is false. That is, we need explicit tunnelling. Then in the beginning of the note you say that DNS can get me deep into the bowels of a private network. To me that says that the world is "transparent tunnelling". Perhaps my choice of words is misleading. By "open a connection", I did not mean "direct" connection but a connection (perhaps through multiple gateways/tunnels, etc.) that at least as far as the host "opensocket" call is concerned is transparent. Again, I'll state my case: If we need explicit tunnelling (like "Target: ..." string in login), then I contend the CONNECT message is better suited to that purpose. If we don't need explicit tunnelling, then drop my CONNECT proposal (and "Target"... string in login!). Jim Hafner Joshua Tseng <jtseng@NishanSystems.com>@ece.cmu.edu on 10-07-2000 09:52:47 AM Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu To: ips@ece.cmu.edu cc: Subject: RE: iSCSI CONNECT message Hi Jim, <snip..snip> >Use of DNS: there may be security concerns here (about DNS itself). But >this also assumes that every iSCSI target has a "public" ipname (or perhaps >ipname:port combo).This may or may not be the case (correct?) if the >controller lives deep in the bowels of some private network. If the controller is in the bowels of some private network, it should still be addressable by DNS, as long as the root authority is talking to the root ICANN servers. Hence, the following DNS name: disk4.hpnetworkA3D.hpnetworkA3.hpnetworkA.hp.com is resolvable on the public Internet as long as the DNS server for "hp.com" is talking to the ICANN ".com" server, and the DNS server for hpnetworkA.hp.com is talking to the server for hp.com, and.... Security concerns about DNS can be handled separately through independent authentication and/or encryption mechanisms between iSCSI entities and/or proxies. <snip..snip> >the pipe is open for them to talk to each other). iSCSI security may be >completely independent of the link security (e.g., that the gateway might >want to impose). The iSCSI login security involves a context that is only >relevant to the two end points as iSCSI entities, not as TCP/IP entities >(i.e., at a different layer). The link security is potentially independent >from the iSCSI security context and is a function of the two ends of an >intermediary link (as TCP or IP entities). Jim, I am in complete agreement here. I would like to add that IPSec provides security between IP endpoints. IPSec provides network level security, while TLS or iSCSI security can provide security for iSCSI entities, since SSL, TLS, and iSCSI security only protects the TCP payload (or a subset of the payload) and not the IP or TCP header, so it can be proxied without changing the payload. IPSec protects the IP header, so it can't be proxied. Rather, the proxy must authenticate and/or decrypt the IPSec before it can forward the data to the next IP endpoint. network domain 1 | network domain 2 | network domain 3 | | iSCSI initiator-----proxy1-----------------proxy2-----------iSCSI target | | | | |<---IPSec----->|<-------IPSec-------->|<-----IPSec------>| |<---TCP 1----->|<-------TCP 2-------->|<-----TCP 3------>| | | |<-------------------iSCSI security or SSL/TLS----------->| |<-------------------iSCSI session----------------------->| | | |<--------------------SCSI session----------------------->| I believe this security model is quite practical as well, since there is no dependency between IPSec and iSCSI. If the administrator wants to protect the proxys, then IPSec can be added and the iSCSI layer and your CONNECT mechanism will be completely ignorant of the presence or nonpresence of IPSec (IPSec has its own key distribution mechanism). IPSec can be managed separately and independently. <snip..snip> >In short, I think I can summarize the issues: >A) if an initiator can ALWAYS open a connection to a target through normal >TCP/IP mechanisms, then there is no need for my proposal. (I didn't think >this was necessarily possible). Additionally, this assumption implies that >target naming is pure and simply an ipname:port and nothing more (that is, >I don't need URLs or any other complicated naming scheme). >B) if NOT, then my proposal defines a means whereby that initiatial >connection can get established, in order that the rest of the iSCSI process >can begin. I think you need a two-part naming mechanism in this case. If >one was enough, then option A holds. My experience with the Public Internet and corporate WANs says that A is not true. Sure, there will always be cases in a private network where the administrator uses IP addresses only with no NAT, and is completely cut off from the Public Internet (military/national defense concerns come to mind). But if iSCSI is to be used through the Public Internet, then I believe your B) might be the case. Josh -----Original Message----- From: Jim Hafner/Almaden/IBM [mailto:hafner@almaden.ibm.com] Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2000 9:33 AM To: ips@ece.cmu.edu Subject: Re: iSCSI CONNECT message Folks, Let's see if I can handle a bunch of these questions at once. I'll admit upfront that I'm not the most knowledgeable about how the IP network works, how DNS works, how tunnelling works, etc. As a consequence, I may be using terms well-known in the network community in the wrong way. Please correct me if I am. Definition: I'm using the term gateway here to mean any device (proxy, etc.) with the following properites: 1) it sits between an initiator and a target (an implementation of a proxy or any other sort of firewall) 2) it obscures the ipname/address of the target on its back-side from the initiator on the front-side. 3) it is NOT an iSCSI target device; it is a device that enables connecting two iSCSI devices (in effect, a gateway is a device that must provide some sort of tunnelling). Or is "intermediary" a better term here? Tunneling: As Costa said, the only standardized tunnelling mechanism defined (AFAIK) is in specific protocols like the HTTP GET URL protocol. As I mentioned in my note, I'm suggesting that perhaps an analogous function is required here. Use of DNS: there may be security concerns here (about DNS itself). But this also assumes that every iSCSI target has a "public" ipname (or perhaps ipname:port combo).This may or may not be the case (correct?) if the controller lives deep in the bowels of some private network. If the controller has a public IPname, then the normal mechanisms for connecting to it should work (even through gateways as described by Joshua). In my proposal, the CONNECT message effectively gets delivered directly to the target in the first step. Is this the same as the login? To me, the login is an initiator to target operation, to validate the iSCSI to iSCSI layer connection end-to-end (once the pipe is open for them to talk to each other). iSCSI security may be completely independent of the link security (e.g., that the gateway might want to impose). The iSCSI login security involves a context that is only relevant to the two end points as iSCSI entities, not as TCP/IP entities (i.e., at a different layer). The link security is potentially independent from the iSCSI security context and is a function of the two ends of an intermediary link (as TCP or IP entities). The CONNECT message then is the instruction to the intermediary to request it's tunnelling services. This gets to one of David's concerns about tunnel autoconfig. My third option (my favorite) for security in the CONNECT was effectivly leveraging whatever tunneling autoconfig policies are in place between the two endpoints of a hop (in the picture below, G1 and G2 may have their own policies, which I assume they impose on each other, independent, perhaps, of the type of traffic). Julo's Topology(a): I---G1---G2---G3---T This is exactly the topology that Daniel and I discussed and the CONNECT message was supposed to enable. If this is "of little interest", then I don't see the point of the CONNECT, either. It may be that a gateway is just a passthru or a proxy or any other mechanism that the gateway utilizes in order to provide the services (QoS, security, etc.) that motivated the placement of that gateway in that spot in the first place! David also mentioned an issue about QoS and such. If I'm a gateway doing all this obsuring, then perhaps I'd like to have policies for QoS as well. Whether they are blind to the type of traffic (iSCSI or http or ...), is a different issue. In short, I think I can summarize the issues: A) if an initiator can ALWAYS open a connection to a target through normal TCP/IP mechanisms, then there is no need for my proposal. (I didn't think this was necessarily possible). Additionally, this assumption implies that target naming is pure and simply an ipname:port and nothing more (that is, I don't need URLs or any other complicated naming scheme). B) if NOT, then my proposal defines a means whereby that initiatial connection can get established, in order that the rest of the iSCSI process can begin. I think you need a two-part naming mechanism in this case. If one was enough, then option A holds. Did I miss anybody's questions? Am I completely off base here? Can somebody say whether (A) holds? Does (A) hold with the requisite security requirements (or is that a separate issue)? Jim Hafner
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