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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] iSNS and zoning> In looking at iSNS draft, I get the impression that the zoning service as currently defined is a poor mimicking of its Fibre Channel counter part. In FC fabric, the switch has several mechanisms to prevent an N/NL_Port from unauthorised/unintended accesses, since it is part of the access path. However, with iSNS, which could be a stand alone name server, I'm having hard time understanding how this storage name server could enforce the claims made in the draft, such as: a) > 3.1.3 Network Zoning Service > .... snip .... > The Network Zoning Service implements the functionality to support > grouping of iSNS client devices into domains for administrative and > access control purposes. > .... b) > 4.3 Zone Object > > .... snip .... > Zoning is a security and management mechanism used to partition > storage resources. Zoning prevents initiators from potentially > logging in to every possible target during device discovery. > .... iSNS as currently defined is only a repository of information of the so called zones. It has no way to prevent an authorised rogue iSCSI initiator from setting up a TCP connection with an iSCSI target. The best place to implement security and access control is the iSCSI target itself. -JP
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