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    RE: iSCSI IPsec-Related Algorithm Proposal



    > CBC MAC has been standardized for years (see FIPS PUB 113 or ANSI X9.17).
    > These standards used DES as the algorithm.  We just need to substitute AES
    > for DES.  Another excellent reference can be found in section 9.5.1 in
    > "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" by Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone.
    > Use of any other algorithms (e.g., one of the new SHAs) raises concerns
    > about being able to scale to 1Gbit/sec.
    
    I'd suggest writing a draft on the use of the AES CBC MAC
    with ESP and starting it through the IPsec WG, as I think
    that would have to come out as an RFC at the same time as
    iSCSI in order for iSCSI to use it.  Such a draft will also
    be necessary to get an ISAKMP value allocated for the MAC,
    which will be needed independent of whether iSCSI uses IKE.
    
    Absent such a draft, we may be left with no choice but to use
    one of the SHAs (or MD5).  FWIW, there are chip vendors who
    are claiming the ability to do SHA-1 at multi-gigabit speeds,
    so I don't think scaling to 1Gbit/sec is a showstopper.  OTOH
    I would agree that whether any of the SHA algorithms can be
    effectively scaled to 10 Gbit/sec in the near future is
    an open issue.
    
    > On the second issue, even if you specify a re-keying algorithm that does
    not
    > solve your problem.  You must also extend the size of the sequence number
    > field itself so that you are not having to re-key as often.  At the
    December
    > 2000 IETF meeting, Steve Kent of the IPsec WG presented proposals covering
    > AES CBC MAC and sequence number rollover (see attached presentation).
    
    I'm familiar with Steve's presentation, as I was in the
    room in San Diego when he gave it.  What he described
    is a worthy goal, but is not compatible on the wire with
    current ESP.  If iSCSI were to depend on this, iSCSI would be
    likely to get caught in a security document hairball/tarball
    behind a whole pile of potentially pending revisions to
    IPsec (e.g., iSCSI will depend on an ESP rev that depends
    on "son of IKE").  I don't recommend this if the goal is
    to get a stable iSCSI document completed in a timely fashion.
    
    > I would expect that we could achieve quick alignment with the IPsec WG on
    > these issues, have the IPsec WG generate any missing RFCs (if they are not
    > already doing so), and reference them in our specification.
    
    Writing drafts that will become the "missing RFCs" is a
    better approach, and (as indicated above) I would stay
    away from any basic revisions to ESP.
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    
    ---------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 42 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 435-1000 x75140     FAX: +1 (508) 497-8500
    black_david@emc.com       Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ---------------------------------------------------
    
    


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Last updated: Tue Sep 04 01:04:22 2001
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