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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: iSCSI: login issue - partial consensus call
Folks,
Though I'm getting ready to throw in the towel on this issue (mostly
because it isn't really worth the fight), I want to state again my rational
for not supporting Option B.
Option A is the simplest for everyone.
Option B has much more complexity and is subject to the same results as
Option A if the C bit is used indiscriminantly. How use of the C-bit is
controlled is actually outside the scope of the standard because
enforcement of requirements is by the receiving end of the protocol and
there's nothing for the target to do in this case. The target can't say "I
don't think you really meant that". A "good" initiator will never set the
C bit unless it really wants it and understands the consequences. A "bad"
initiator (because of bad programming) will set the C bit first and then
handle the rejection as a retry (but when there is no rejection, the bad
effects have already happened). A "good/bad" initiator may not set the C
bit first, but then set it after a rejection because it thinks it owns the
ISID space (e.g., doesn't even know or care that there might be another HBA
around) -- and we all know systems that behave this way!
The net of this is, in my opinion, that what we're trying to protect
against with Option B won't really be protected, so why bother with the
extra protocol.
And in reply to David's suggestion for a mandatory management interface to
disable the C-bit. If iSCSI can mandate that, then it can mandate a
management interface for setting/configuring ISID partitions and the
problem goes away of non-cooperating HBAs.
Jim Hafner
Black_David@emc.com@ece.cmu.edu on 09/06/2001 07:10:37 am
Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
To: Nick.Martin@compaq.com, ips@ece.cmu.edu
cc:
Subject: RE: iSCSI: login issue - partial consensus call
Trying to close this issue, I think Nick's points are valid and
answer the question about when the "C-bit" would not be set --
when the entity sending the command suspects (or wants to protect
against) a problem in ISID assignment. That appears to make option
B) the right choice:
B) Should iSCSI mandate making this intended cleanup explicit
by setting a bit (Say C-bit, for Clear) in the Login Command
PDU to prevent an accidental session cleanup with a buggy
initiator code?
I have the following additional comments:
(1) A new bit is needed. Reuse of the X-bit for this purpose has been
rejected by rough consensus of the WG.
(2) In order to deal with the worst case, every iSCSI implementation
MUST have an administrative interface that can prevent this new
"C-bit" from ever being set, even if the implementation thinks
that setting it is the right thing to do. This provides a
way to deal with situations in which sessions are getting
stomped on by ISID problems.
(3) Some additional words about ISID usage are needed to encompass
scenarios in which ISID assignment is not present, does not
assign enough ISIDs, or fails for some reason.
Comments are welcome. Further objection to B) needs to explain
why Nick's scenarios should not be considered. I was disappointed
to see a prior statement that the ISIDs would be different "by
definition" - this is in the same category as saying that software
and protocol implementations are bug-free "by definition". Keep in
mind that Nick is correct in saying:
> The problem is that iSCSI does not and will not specify how two HBAs
> from different vendors installed in the same Initiator should or could
> get a range of ISIDs for their exclusive use. This will be operating
> system specific and vendor defined.
Thanks,
--David
---------------------------------------------------
David L. Black, Senior Technologist
EMC Corporation, 42 South St., Hopkinton, MA 01748
+1 (508) 435-1000 x75140 FAX: +1 (508) 497-8500
black_david@emc.com Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
---------------------------------------------------
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Martin, Nick [mailto:Nick.Martin@compaq.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2001 5:50 PM
> To: KRUEGER,MARJORIE (HP-Roseville,ex1); ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: RE: iSCSI: login issue - partial consensus call
>
>
> Marj,
>
> You mention vendors not knowing how to play right.
> The problem is that iSCSI does not and will not specify how two HBAs
> from different vendors installed in the same Initiator should or could
> get a range of ISIDs for their exclusive use. This will be operating
> system specific and vendor defined. It is uncertain that the same tool
> or repository would be used by all HBA vendors in any environment.
> Given this, accidental overlap in ISID space is not unlikely.
>
> Given that there is no one way to play right, we must make sure that
> everyone can at least play nice.
>
> My expectation is that sessions are infrequently established and long
> lived. ISIDs may be re-used at will by their current owners. When no
> "already owned" ISIDs are available, or an attempt to re-use an "already
> owned" ISID failed, and HBA would need to a) "probe" for a new available
> ISID or b) fail the request to establish the session. Session recovery
> should not be attempted unless a session is known to have failed.
>
> If tools are available, and the administrator has used them correctly,
> then HBAs will not collide in ISID space. If the tools are not
> available or were not used correctly, I would hope the second HBA can
> still attempt to come up without impacting the sessions established by
> the first.
>
> Again, I state my support for a login with existing ISID harmlessly
> fails (the Target state does not change) unless a session recovery
> indicator is set. Also if a session recovery indicator is set, and the
> ISID is not in use (by this Initiator at this Target), the login also
> fails.
>
> Thanks,
> Nick
> -----Original Message-----
> From: KRUEGER,MARJORIE (HP-Roseville,ex1)
> [mailto:marjorie_krueger@hp.com]
> Sent: Friday, August 31, 2001 12:09 PM
> To: Martin, Nick; ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: RE: iSCSI: login issue - partial consensus call
>
>
> > In particular this enables independent agents within the same
> initiator to
> > attempt a login without knowing all ISIDs in use by other agents.
> Each
> > agent would know the ISID of sessions it had successfully
> established,
> but
> > not the ISIDs for sessions established by others. It can use the
> ISIDs it
> > knows to recover sessions it owns. If an agent gets a failure
> attempting
> to
> > establish a new session, it would pick a different ISID and
> > retry (or just quit), rather than disrupting a session of another
> agent.
>
> The intent of the presentation on SCSI/iSCSI modeling, and the text in
> the
> draft, is to illustrate how this example is not a recommended
> implementation
> choice due to the probability of violating the SCSI/iSCSI
> rules pointed
> out.
> If the "independant agents" had partitioned the ISID space,
> there would
> be
> no collision on login and no time wasted. Your illustrated
> implementation
> could spend significant time "trying" ISID's in use by the "other
> agents".
>
> However, I'm starting to have more sympathy with Julian's concerns due
> to
> the apparent risks of different vendors' initiator implementations not
> following the rules.
>
> I just imagined having vendor A's HBA installed and happily servicing
> applications, installing vendor B's "plug-n-play" implementation, and
> having
> all A's sessions aborted cause B doesn't know how to play right :-(
>
> Marj
>
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