RE: Question on security document

["Ofer Biran" <BIRAN@il.ibm.com>]

Bob,

The intention of the security document was tutorial, elaborated discussion,
motivations and more detailed guidelines and recommendations for the
security aspects.

The "official" mandatory statements are only in the standard RFCs. I'm not
sure
about the IETF rule for informational RFC but I don't see a problem with
MUST
statements there as long as they are in sync with the corresponding
standard
RFC.

   Regards,
      Ofer



Ofer Biran
Storage and Systems Technology
IBM Research Lab in Haifa
biran@il.ibm.com  972-4-8296253


Robert Snively <rsnively@Brocade.COM>@ece.cmu.edu on 18/10/2001 17:35:35

Please respond to Robert Snively <rsnively@Brocade.COM>

Sent by:  owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu


To:   "'Paul Koning'" <ni1d@arrl.net>, cmonia@NishanSystems.com
cc:   ips@ece.cmu.edu
Subject:  RE: Question on security document



Paul,

I rather prefer to see the security mandates carried in
the primary documents, as our IETF mentors originally proposed.
That way, there is less possibility of inconsistent
language that may change the primary documents.  Then the
security document would be a tutorial and remain informational.
This will simplify the standardization process, because
each of us will only have to read the security document for
guidelines to our development of the security section of the
primary documents.  If we were to make the security document
the standard, then each of us will have to
read the entire document to make sure that some global
restriction does not fall unintentionally on a particular
protocol.

If we do choose to make the security document the authoritative
document (which I would vote against), then it needs a major
rewrite to clarify, separate, and make more precise the requirements for
each protocol.

Charles,

If the security document was intended as a draft of the security
sections for each protocol, it needs a major rewrite to separate
the particular language to be dropped into each document from the
tutorial information.  It then needs to formulate much more
clearly and formally the language that will be dropped into the
primary documents.  That would be okay with me, but the draft
should indicate that the language to be dropped into the
primary documents is only proposed and that the actual applicable
standards information is contained in the primary document.

Bob

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Koning [mailto:ni1d@arrl.net]
> Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2001 7:37 AM
> To: cmonia@NishanSystems.com
> Cc: ips@ece.cmu.edu
> Subject: RE: Question on security document
>
>
> Excerpt of message (sent 17 October 2001) by Charles Monia:
> > Hi:
> >
> > I had assumed that one goal of the document was to set
> forth the language
> > necessary for each spec to pass muster with the IESG in the realm of
> > security.  If that's correct, I'm concerned that the
> suggested change may
> > compromise that intent.
> >
> > Charles
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Robert Snively [mailto:rsnively@Brocade.COM]
> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 4:31 PM
> > > To: 'ips@ece.cmu.edu'
> > > Subject: Question on security document
> > >
> > >
> > > I have a recommendation to the authors of the security
> > > document:
> > > ...
>
> The problem, as Bob is right to point out, is that informational RFCs
> by definition cannot establish requirements on implementations.  So if
> you want there to be security requirements that apply to iFCP, iSCSI,
> and so on, they can only be stated in standards track RFCs, not
> informational RFCs.  It may be a separate document or part of the IPS
> document it applies to.
>
> So one answer is for the security draft not to be informational
> anymore.
>
>    paul
>
>