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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAPBut it is Required to implement, so the link has as much security as the administrator requires for the situation. So if IPsec is not being used it is because a) the administrator doesn't care about wire security b) the administrator doesn't have anything that needs to be protected c) the administrator doesn't have the resources to protect it. So for those reasons I don't buy the argument in your first paragraph... The rest is just strict ACL... For you do not need SRP to provide identity information, I could just as easily send username="Bill" password="foo" over the wire and it will provide the same functionality (all SRP does is prevent you from having to send Bill and foo over the wire directly at the cost of a lot of mathematics. And with a link that is administratively configured to be adequately secure, I don't see the problem with it. I do not understand why you are requiring IPsec/IKE, but refusing to consider a much simpler to configure/support TLS. It sounds like many of the problems that you are having that are requiring you to go with a protocol that has unknown IP rights, and licensing behind it could be easily solved by changing the security from IPsec to TLS, but that is my opinion. I think the problem is that people are trying to solve way too many problems, assume that IPsec has adiquate link security and go from there. If IPsec is not capable of securing the link, then remove the solution and replace it with a technology that can secure the link... Bill +========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+ Bill Strahm Software Development is a race between Programmers Member of the trying to build bigger and better idiot proof software Technical Staff and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better bill@sanera.net idiots. (503) 601-0263 So far the Universe is winning --- Rich Cook -----Original Message----- From: John Hufferd [mailto:hufferd@us.ibm.com] Sent: Friday, October 19, 2001 1:54 AM To: Bill Strahm Cc: IPS Reflector (E-mail) Subject: RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP Bill, IPSec is optional to use! So you can not assume that you have a Secure connection. And even if you use IPSec, you can not be sure that Privacy (encryption) is being used. So for these reasons alone you need to have an iSCSI method of Authentication. Next, the lower levels only know that the link is OK to be use for something. It does not know that it is iSCSI that is using the link, and if it did it does not have access to the iSCSI ACLs. Nor does iSCSI know what is handled at the lower levels so it must do its own ACL processing. Even if the link is secure (perhaps even encrypted) and iSCSI Authentication finds out that you are user "Bill", that does not say that you have the right to get at All resources. "Bill" will be authorized to operate from certain iSCSI Initiator Nodes, and those nodes will only be permitted to see certain approprate LUs. These are all iSCSI functions NOT TCP or IPSec. Your suggestion to use TLS, was fully discussed in Irvine, and that issue is now behind us. . . . John L. Hufferd Senior Technical Staff Member (STSM) IBM/SSG San Jose Ca Main Office (408) 256-0403, Tie: 276-0403, eFax: (408) 904-4688 Home Office (408) 997-6136 Internet address: hufferd@us.ibm.com "Bill Strahm" <bill@sanera.net>@ece.cmu.edu on 10/17/2001 02:19:38 PM Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu To: "IPS Reflector \(E-mail\)" <ips@ece.cmu.edu> cc: Subject: RE: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP Just to bring up a cynical point. Why do we need SRP anyway... after all I am running over a required secure channel, so there should be no problem with just sending a user ID/Passphrase over the secure channel. This will prevent a LOT of interoperability problems, extra code required to implement additional security algorithms, etc. This makes my implementation much simpler, I can seperate login/authentication parameters (currently SRP) vs. setting up a secure channel (IPsec). If we go the Application level secure authentication method, I would rather we replace the security layer with TLS rather than IPsec, so we get authentication/security all in one place rather than scattered around lower layer protocols, application protocols... Bill Strahm +========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+=========+ Bill Strahm Software Development is a race between Programmers Member of the trying to build bigger and better idiot proof software Technical Staff and the Universe trying to produce bigger and better bill@sanera.net idiots. (503) 601-0263 So far the Universe is winning --- Rich Cook -----Original Message----- From: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu [mailto:owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu]On Behalf Of Michael Schoberg Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2001 12:53 PM To: IPS Reflector (E-mail) Subject: iSCSI: Login authentication SRP/CHAP I'm having some problems figuring out the exact implementation for the login authentication protocols being proposed. Is anyone else having similar issues answering these questions: What is the hashing algorithm that will be used for SRP authentication (SHA-1, MD5, HMAC-SHA1)? The SRP negotiation passes the following information (T->I): SRP_s = SRP salt SRP_N = (SRP n value - Large prime number. All computations are performed modulo n) SRP_g = Primitive root modulo of n By passing [N] & [g] (T->I), does this mean the initiator must verify that [N] is a prime and [g] is a primitive root modulo of [N]? What are the min/max digits for [N] and [g]? If any of these are not satisfied (N not prime, g not primitive modulo root, #digits too small or large), could it be used as an attack against the initiator or be used to derive the initiator's password? The reference to RFC 1994 does not fully describe the CHAP function for iSCSI, it describes the CHAP message protocol which isn't really used in our case. There's some parameters that need to be nailed down. What is the CHAP hash algorithm: (MD5)? What is the sequence of hashes that take place on a CHAP challenge to form the CHAP digest? The iSCSI draft allows for algorithm selection (CHAP_A=<A1,A2,...>) but doesn't describe any. Are these supposed to dictate the hashing function or give a description of [what/how it] gets hashed (or both)? Will there be a mandatory set (A1..An) that compliant iSCSI implementations must provide? Is there a reference that actually shows the sequence for a CHAP digest being formed from MD5 hashes? It would help to have an appendix with real username/password examples of the result exchange? A table with a few sample sets would be useful for validating designs.
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