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    iSCSI security clarifications



    Gathering up a bunch of security topics/questions that
    need to be addressed from the last few weeks of email.
    
    -- SRP Intellectual Property
    
    Yes, this situation is confusing and unclear.  It is
    also evolving (e.g., the zero-cost Stanford license
    is a recent development).  I will endeavor to obtain
    clarity and explain it at the Salt Lake City meeting.
    If clarity is not obtainable, it would be reasonable to
    remove the "MUST" requirement for implementing SRP at
    that time.
    
    -- Substituting CHAP for SRP as the REQUIRED mechanism
    
    Not a good idea.  Situations can be expected in which
    IPsec is turned off by an administrator who relies on
    authentication.  CHAP is considerably weaker than SRP
    in this situation because (all too common) weak passwords
    for CHAP are vulnerable to off-line dictionary attacks,
    whereas SRP does not have this vulnerability.
    
    -- IPsec requirements
    
    A quick reminder that IPsec is "MUST implement" but
    "MAY use" for all of our protocols.  Arguments that
    start from assuming the use of IPsec could lead to
    having to strengthen the "MAY use" requirement, and
    this should be considered by folks making such
    arguments.
    
    We are subsetting IPsec (e.g., AH is NOT REQUIRED) for
    all of our protocols.  While quoting requirements
    from IPsec RFCs is illuminating and useful to understand
    what was originally done in IPsec and why, those requirements
    are not necessarily binding on us.  We do have to exercise
    good engineering and security judgment in picking our
    subset (e.g., leaving out AH is an example of doing so).
    This approach of picking an appropriate subset of IPsec
    does have the approval of the IETF Security area,
    as long as we don't do anything obviously wrong.
    One other specific example is that "MUST implement
    DES" (as required by the current IPsec RFCs) will
    only go into IPS WG documents over my dead body ;-).
    
    -- TLS for iSCSI
    
    Those interested in standardizing the use of TLS for
    iSCSI should write and submit an Internet-Draft.
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    
    ---------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 42 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 435-1000 x75140     FAX: +1 (508) 497-8500
    black_david@emc.com       Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ---------------------------------------------------
    


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Last updated: Mon Nov 19 17:17:36 2001
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