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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: iSCSI: DH-CHAPDavid, Being that 'participant' I'd like to clarify that my comments (that were not that private as the security team was copied) were on an earlier rough draft David Black posted to the security team just few days before posting to the general IPS list, and apart from that I'm not aware of '[closed] design process' on the security team for DH-CHAP. My main comment was about active impersonation + off line dictionary attack and a misleading text (in my view) that ignored this attack. The final version now clearly describes it both in the overview and section 6. I also commented that getting a password can cause much more damage than connection hijack after login phase, and this is also mentioned in section 6.5. So one has to admit that the draft states fairly and clearly the main DH-CHAP deficiency - vulnerability to active dictionary attack. Now - the WG should decide whether the 'IP issue' of SRP is a good enough reason to replace it with another mandatory method, introducing this deficiency. SRP was originally chosen over CHAP due to the risk of an attacker obtaining the password. DH-CHAP only makes that attack 'networkly' more difficult, but still possible. As I understand it, the IP situation of SRP (free license of the actual patent, 'reasonable and non-discriminatory' IETF statements for the patents that were brought up as 'might be related'), according to the IETF policy, should not cause the WG to change for something technically deficient. I currently vote for putting DH-CHAP as another MAY method (it does provide valuable resilience over CHAP in certain environments, and the draft seems in a pretty good shape), unless somebody convince me that I misunderstood the SRP IP situation and/or the IETF policy. Regards, Ofer Ofer Biran Storage and Systems Technology IBM Research Lab in Haifa biran@il.ibm.com 972-4-8296253 David Jablon <dpj@theworld.com>@ece.cmu.edu on 11/04/2002 21:16:42 Please respond to David Jablon <dpj@theworld.com> Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu To: David Black <Black_David@emc.com> cc: <ips@ece.cmu.edu>, <ElizabethRodriguez@ieee.org>, <Elizabeth.G.Rodriguez@123mail.net> Subject: Re: iSCSI: DH-CHAP David, I respectfully request that my name be removed from the acknowlegements section of <draft-black-ips-iscsi-dhchap-00.txt>, as it might otherwise lead people to mistakenly believe that I was a willing and active participant in the design effort. I am strongly opposed to designing a cryptographic authentication protocol with the deliberate goal to be vulnerable to active attack. For the record, I responded to an unsolicited draft that was forwarded to me in a private email, along with other comments, by one of the participants in this design process that was otherwise closed-to-me. My reply, out of courtesy to that participant, was exactly this: >Your comments were good, and I'd say that the draft looks to >be in good enough shape for the purposes of IPS discussion, >except to note that "passwords" are never mentioned. > >If serious cryptographic review were necessary, then I think a lot of >people would argue the point that the draft is necessarily >out of scope for IPS consideration today anyway. Apparently, those comments resulted in a draft that includes discussion about passwords. However, evidence of serious cryptographic review remains to be seen, and seems problematic in light of the technical design goals. In light of this, the motivation for this work, and my earlier public comments regarding closed vs. open design process, I hope you'll understand why I prefer to not have my name associated with this effort. Thanks. Best regards, David Jablon
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