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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: iSCSI: Negotiation clarifications still neededMartins, Comments in the same order. 1. Julian may be adding wording for this. 2. Seems to me that we need to stipulate that only key values may straddle PDU boundaries - key names (ideally inclusive of "=") shall not. That should avoid requiring blank PDUs. 3. I don't have a strong opinion on this. I don't believe this can cause interoperability problems; OTOH, I don't care if the responder isn't that liberal. 4. Julian and I discussed this scenario a while ago. As you precisely described, only a non-stop dialogue can be reliable and we can't afford a non-stop dialogue. I suppose one can recover the StatSN with a SNACK in FFP, or terminate the connection upon a timeout. -- Mallikarjun Mallikarjun Chadalapaka Networked Storage Architecture Network Storage Solutions Hewlett-Packard MS 5668 Roseville CA 95747 cbm@rose.hp.com ----- Original Message ----- From: "Martins Krikis" <mkrikis@yahoo.com> To: "Julian Satran" <Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com> Cc: <ips@ece.cmu.edu> Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 12:38 PM Subject: iSCSI: Negotiation clarifications still needed > The previous thread went on too long, but since it > has now quieted down, I'll conjecture that the > following are the aspects that still need to be > addressed. > > 1. Not everybody seemed to have noticed that it is > NOT legal to send the same key again, if it > has once been negotiated (including negotiations > that end with a reserved value (Reject, > Irrelevant or NotUnderstood). > > I think it would benefit the draft to add the > sentence that Pat proposed to paragraph 5 or page > 72 in 12-92: "Sending the key again would be a > re-negotiation". That I think would make it crystal > clear. > > 2. When the key=value pairs that Originator is > sending are broken across multiple PDUs, it > is not clear whether the Responder may start > responding to the keys as soon as it receives > them or whether it should send blank PDUs back > (as in the example on page 164 of 12-92) until > it gets a PDU, the data part of which ends in > a NUL byte (thus signaling that there are no > broken key=value pairs at the end of it). > > I am proposing that the draft should make it explicit > that only blank PDUs are to be sent. This allows > decoupling of key=value generation from > their encapsulation in PDUs (i.e., the generating > logic need not worry about whether a key=value > pair will fit and go out in this PDU or has to > be retained to go out in the next). I can explain > in detail why this is important (it has to do > with teh possibility of receiving the "just-about > outgoing" keys) but I'm keeping this "brief". > > Furthermore, it is my feeling that instead of > checking the last bytes of a PDU for NUL, it > would be better if the end-of-data was marked by > a flag in the header. This way encapsulation will > be simpler---just put as much data in the PDU as > fits there and raise the flag if it isn't all, > instead of checking whether it ends in a NUL and > possibly shortening data to make it not end like > that. > > 3. There is an opinion that on page 73 of 12-92, > the phrase that says "or the responder may > select an admissible value" is in contradiction > to the very next sentence. There is also an > opinion that this phrase is entirely unnecessary > and detrimental to achieving broad > interoperability (I call it "cutting slack to > misbehaving or incompatible originators"). > > I don't have a suggestion since I consider the > "feature" that this phrase allows of little > importance to a properly built iSCSI node. > > 4. This is new. When doing Text Request/Response > negotiations (i.e., in FFP), it seems > that the Initiator commits to the new values > when it receives a response from the Target with > the F bit set. It is unclear when the Target should > commit. Should it switch to using the new values > as soon as it sends its response with the F-bit > set, or should it do so only when it knows that > the Initiator received its response? > > Commiting right away is simpler and since responses > with F-bits set have TTT=0xffffffff and thus > may not be reset, sounds plausible. If the > values have importance on the next reception, > it may also be important to commit timely. However, > what if the Initiator doesn't get this response? > Target now has committed, Initiator hasn't. Committing > later puts the burden on Initiator to send something > effectively telling "I've received your final > response". Otherwise the Target will time out and > not commit. This response can get lost too. > > Basically, it is beginning to look a bit like > (what was it called?) "distributed consensus problem"? > I think it goes like this: > > Two generals that are on oposite sides of the > enemy want to synchronize their attack, and > start sending messengers through with messages > like > "attack at dawn->", > "<-ok, attack at dawn", > "I know you know we attack at dawn->", > "<-, I know you know I know we attack at dawn", > etc., etc., ... > But at no point can they commit yet... > > Is anybody else worried about this? > Anyway, so when should a target commit? Page 83 > of 12-92 is the relevant reference. > > Thanks, > > Martins Krikis > > Disclaimer: these opinions are my own and may > not be those of my employer. > > > __________________________________________________ > Do You Yahoo!? > LAUNCH - Your Yahoo! Music Experience > http://launch.yahoo.com >
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