SORT BY:

LIST ORDER
THREAD
AUTHOR
SUBJECT


SEARCH

IPS HOME


    [Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

    Re: UNH Plugfest 5




    Paul,

    The aim of the standard is to create interoperale protocols not administrators.
    An administrator may cause initiators and target NOT TO interoperate in a myriad of ways.

    The basic assumptions for the whole security setup is that the administrator will set them
    so that they can intemperate and the standard setter provides him with the means to do so.

    Your assumption that initiators and target should be able to interoperate regardless of their administrative entities
    is not what standards do.


    Julo


    Paul Koning <pkoning@equallogic.com>

    15/01/03 18:10

    To
    Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM@IBMIL
    cc
    ips@ece.cmu.edu, owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu
    Subject
    Re: UNH Plugfest 5





    >>>>> "Julian" == Julian Satran <Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com> writes:

    Julian> Paul, Initiators are required to implement authentication but
    Julian> may use none. If the administrator insists that
    Julian> authentication must be used with redirectors too the same
    Julian> administrator will have to take care that the redirectors
    Julian> have the required authentication.

    Julian> The standard does not have to say anything about it..

    Julian> We can't take the position of weakening always the security
    Julian> of the redirector nor one of requiring everybody to follow a
    Julian> stricter authetication.

    Do we want interoperability or don't we?  My view of standards is that
    they exist for the purpose of producing interoperability.

    What you describe creates interop failures.  If the initiator wants to
    require authentication before redirect, that will fail unless the
    target supports that, but there's nothing in the standard requiring
    the target to do so.  So I have conforming implementations that can't
    talk to each other.  That's not a good idea.

    Why do you say "weakening...the security of the redirector"?  I don't
    see any security issue in sending the redirect before completing the
    authentication.  Bob Russell explained that in his original note.

    If there were a security problem, I'd be the first to argue for
    requiring the authentication to be completed first.  But since there
    is none, why require it?  And if it's not required, why allow for
    configurations that break?

          paul




Home

Last updated: Wed Jan 15 13:19:02 2003
12180 messages in chronological order