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    RE: Ciphersuites for IKEv2



    
    Per the admonition in David's email below, I would like to request that in addition to the following cipher suites already on the list:
    
    AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA-1
    AES-CTR + AES-CBC MAC w/XCBC
    
    that the following additional cipher suites be added:
    
    AES-CBC + AES-CBC-MAC w/XCBC
    AES-CTR + HMAC-SHA-1
    
    As noted above, these algorithms will already exist in an implementation.  Not being able to use them in the added combinations simply because we do not have a ciphersuite defined for them seems like a real easy thing to fix at this point.
    
    In addition to the points made by David below, these additional combinations will also help implementers gain the full benefit of the investment that they are making and will allow users to utilize the full capability of the product that they are paying for. 
    
    Howard
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Black_David@emc.com [mailto:Black_David@emc.com]
    Sent: Wednesday, January 22, 2003 8:14 AM
    To: ips@ece.cmu.edu
    Subject: FW: Ciphersuites for IKEv2
    
    The ipsec WG is in the process of defining a new version of
    the IKE protocol for IPsec authentication, key exchange, SA
    creation and the like.
    
    A major change from the current IKE is that all cryptographic
    aspects of SA creation are bundled into suites for negotiation
    rather than being independently negotiable, as fewer combinations
    to implement and test increases the likelihood of interoperability
    and reduces the opportunities for things to go worng in peculiar
    combinations that are unlikely to be useful.  This is part of
    a radical change to IKE/ISAKMP negotiation to fix a number of
    problems with the way it currently works.
    
    The proposal forwarded below has just been floated to define
    the initial suites.  The most important aspect of it is that
    the proposed AES suite definitions bind encryption mode and
    integrity algorithm (MAC) together, specifically:
    
    - AES-CBC suites are only defined with HMAC-SHA1
    	(cannot use AES-CBC MAC w/XCBC)
    - AES-CTR suites are only defined with AES-CBC MAC w/XCBC
    	(cannot use HMAC-SHA1)
    
    If this is a problem for anyone, they need to comment on the
    ipsec mailing list (ipsec@lists.tislabs.com) ASAP.  Please
    read the entire message forwarded below (including the "Possible
    issues:" section at its end) before commenting.  Also, please
    note that 3DES-CBC and HMAC-SHA1 will be "MUST implement", so
    hence there's not as much implementation advantage as might
    initially appear to AES-CBC + AES-CBC MAC w/XCBC as HMAC-SHA1
    has to be there anyhow.
    
    Further discussion of this should be on the ipsec WG mailing
    list (ipsec@lists.tislabs.com) - this is just an FYI for IPS
    folks working with IPsec.  None of this affects any requirements
    in the current IPS protocol specifications - this is an FYI
    about where this area of technology is headed.
    
    Thanks,
    --David
    ----------------------------------------------------
    David L. Black, Senior Technologist
    EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA  01748
    +1 (508) 293-7953             FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786
    black_david@emc.com        Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754
    ----------------------------------------------------
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Paul Hoffman / VPNC [mailto:paul.hoffman@vpnc.org]
    Sent: Tuesday, January 21, 2003 6:42 PM
    To: ipsec@lists.tislabs.com
    Subject: Ciphersuites for IKEv2
    
    
    Given the looming deadline for us to finish on IKEv2, we need to come to
    some agreement on ciphersuites. The following comments are based on the
    -04 draft.
    
    In section 5.3.1, it says:
    
    >For Suite-ID, the following values are defined:
    >
    >	  Name            Number   Algorithms
    >	  IKE_CLASSIC       0       DH-Group #5 (1536 bits)
    >					3DES encryption
    >					HMAC-SHA1 integrity and prf
    >
    >	  ESP_CLASSIC       1       3DES encryption
    >					HMAC-SHA1 integrity
    >	  <some AES variants, AH (?))
    >
    >	  values 2-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65533 are
    >	  for private use among mutually consenting parties.
    
    Later, in section 5.14, it says:
    
    >  The mandatory to implement algorithms are AES-128-CBC and HMAC-SHA1.
    
    
    So far, this list hasn't been able to agree on whether these are good
    values, mostly due to people having different priorities. I propose that
    the priority we choose for creating the MUST implement suite be that of
    greatest interoperability. This means that we should not expect any
    current IPsec vendor who has hardware acceleration to need to make
    hardware upgrades to their IPsec devices.
    
    Beyond that, we should also define suites that are expected to be used
    in typical circumstances, but we should not attach a MUST or even a
    SHOULD to those suites. We should also *not* name the suites because the
    names will impart meaning in the future that may not be true. For
    example, the name "IKE_CLASSIC" implies that the values are those used
    by typical IKEv1 systems, but that is not true because many systems
    don't even implement DH Group 5 (even though they obviously should).
    
    Given those criteria, I propose that the following text be used in
    section 5.3.1 (and the text noted above in section 5.14 be removed):
    
    =====
    
    For Suite-ID, the following values are defined:
    
    Suite-ID  Meaning
    --------  -------
    0         Covers: IKE
              168-bit 3DES CBC encryption
              Diffie-Hellman group 2 (1024-bit)
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity and prf
    
    1         Covers: ESP
              3DES encryption with three keys
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity
    
    2         Covers: AH
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity
    
    3         Covers: IKE
              168-bit 3DES CBC encryption
              Diffie-Hellman group 5 (1536-bit)
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity and prf
    
    4         Covers: IKE
              AES encryption in CBC mode with 128-bit keys
              Diffie-Hellman group 5 (1536-bit)
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity and prf
    
    5         Covers: IKE
              AES encryption in CBC mode with 128-bit keys
              Diffie-Hellman group 14 (2048-bit)
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity and prf
    
    6         Covers: ESP
              AES encryption in CBC mode with 128-bit keys
              HMAC-SHA1 integrity
    
    7         Covers: IKE
              AES encryption in CTR mode with 128-bit keys
              Diffie-Hellman group 14 (2048-bit)
              AES-CBC MAC + XCBC integrity and prf
    
    8         Covers: ESP
              AES encryption in CTR mode with 128-bit keys
              AES-CBC MAC + XCBC integrity
    
    Values 9-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65533 are for private
    use among mutually consenting parties. Additional Suite-ID values will
    be assigned by IANA based on consultation with the IESG.
    
    All implementations of IKEv2 MUST be able to negotiate Suite-ID 0 and
    Suite-ID 1. Implementations SHOULD be able to negotiate Suite-IDs 3, 4,
    5, and 6.
    
    The must-be-implemented ciphersuites (0 and 1) are based on
    currently-deployed hardware that meets the security requirements of the
    vast majority of current IPsec users, and should be useful for at least
    a decade according to cryptographic estimates from NIST for business
    user scenarios. The should-be-implemented ciphersuites (3, 4, 5, and 6)
    are based on expectations of where the security industry is moving
    (namely, to the AES encryption suite) and where more security-conscious
    users are moving as current key lengths become more attackable due to
    the steady lowering of cost to mount brute-force attacks.
    
    An important lesson learned from IKEv1 is that no system should only
    implement the mandatory algorithms and expect them to be the best choice
    for all customers. For example, at the time that this document was being
    written, many IKEv1 implementers are starting to migrate to AES in CBC
    mode for VPN applications. Many IPsec systems based on IKEv2 will
    implement AES, longer Diffie-Hellman keys, and additional hash
    algorithms, and some IPsec customers already require these algorithms in
    addition to the mandatory ones listed above.
    
    =====
    
    Possible issues:
    
    - Some people may want to have more suites as fallbacks in case of
    a catastrophic failure of an algorithm. The WG seemed to want fewer
    suites. This is why I had the IANA registry being updated with IESG
    consultation instead of a standards-track RFC: we could get a number
    easily for a non-compromised suite. Having a zillion suites defined
    early won't cause implementers to handle them; note that TIGER was
    a SHOULD in IKEv1 and almost no one implemented it at all.
    
    - Should the ESP and AH MUST and SHOULDs be in the IKEv2 document or
    in 2401bis? I think they should be in IKEv2, but others have said that
    because they cover IPsec themselves, they should be in 2401bis.
    
    
    --Paul Hoffman, Director
    --VPN Consortium
    


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