RE: Comments on the Draft

[julian_satran@il.ibm.com]

On 1 - depends on where thing go with asymmetric vs. symmetric.

2 - Explicit error codes - isn't that the sense function?

3 - For the flag - probably yes- but I am not sure.  Status implies it so
you need it
only if status is bad - which can be before the end.

Julo

"Hall, Howard" <howard@pirus.com> on 13/09/2000 20:50:10

Please respond to "Hall, Howard" <howard@pirus.com>

To:   Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM@IBMIL
cc:
Subject:  RE: Comments on the Draft




Julo,

Thank you very much for your thoughtful response.
What do you think of some of the other issues (reference the original
email):
- whether CmdRN, MaxCmdRN, etc. should be used for in-order delivery of
commands across multiple TCP connections in a session (Comments for Section
2.2.2).
- more explicit error codes
- the proposed flag described at the end of the email

-Howard

-----Original Message-----
From: julian_satran@il.ibm.com [mailto:julian_satran@il.ibm.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2000 4:52 AM
To: Hall, Howard
Subject: Re: Comments on the Draft




1. General -

Loss of synchronization - we hope to be able one day to get to a better
solution
but I would suggest to recommend the implementer to drop the connections as
it won't be able to parse a reset too, reinstate them and then try a reset
to distinguish it clearly from other events. If it happens in a target -
drop - and wait for a reconnect then send an AE to indicate the event and
wait for reset.
As for inconsistencies - I've added your proposal to the todo list - thank
you.

2. The view is a qualifier for the name - it allows a target to a second
level of refinement about what he things it should show the initiator. The
first part of the name itself is the first level - but for those that are
conservative in the use of names they are left with the view.

3. We structured it to follow closely FCP - for bridging reasons. As far as
I can recall
Response  comes first followed by sense. We will state it explicitly in the
document
thanks.

4.timeouts - yes you are right and I stated it already in an older note
about bridging. We where thinking about three timers:

- command delivery
- data delivery
- status delivery

Those should be set at the session initiation and be known to the initiator
and target but they don't have to be necessarily sent over the wire (as
they imply mostly local actions in the endpoints).

5. immediate data length negotiation - will fix the negotiation parameters
- thanks.
We think also about limiting it by default to 64k(?)

6. iSCSI check - the reason I choose to make it SCSI check too is to get a
"hook"
into ACA behavior. I think that is mandatory  - without it all hell breaks
loose!
Both initiator and target could be built the with ACA on check condition.
We can remove the iSCSI status field and add a set of basic sense bytes
detailing the error.
Let us keep talking on this item.

7. The security parts are being rewritten just as we talk and we hope that
we will all see them
soon

8. Target reset will be changed to have two types - soft and hard reset.

9. closing connection. Yes you are right it needs more text. And we already
agreed to add a logout (on a different connection to force connection
close) and remove the RID from login

Thanks  for your careful reading and hope to see you on row 1 or 2 at the
next IETF meeting,
Julo



"Hall, Howard" <howard@pirus.com> on 13/09/2000 02:12:38

Please respond to "Hall, Howard" <howard@pirus.com>

To:   ips@ece.cmu.edu
cc:    (bcc: Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM)
Subject:  Comments on the Draft




Here are some detailed questions, issues, and proposals we have come up
with
after reviewing the draft closely.

-Howard

Howard Hall
Pirus Networks
www.pirus.com

-----------------------

Section: General

We need to explicitly describe in the draft how to handle loss of iSCSI
parsing synchronization on a TCP stream.
Resynchronization can be accomplished by shutting down the TCP connection.
If it's the command stream that gets reset, iSCSI needs to "remember" an
error code for this session  (for how long?), so that it can let its client
know what happened when the command session gets reestablished.
Similarly, suggestions should be made on how to respond when the other side
sends messages that don't make sense, i.e.: a target sends bogus RTT
messages, or repeated "opcode not understood"
We propose that the draft, in general, should state that initiators and
targets should 'play safe' - especially avoiding bogus reads and writes.
Initiators can use the 'escalating big hammer' approach, terminating the
task, terminating the connection/session, resetting the device.

Finally, what should a target do if it detects inconsistencies in the data
buffers for a write command e.g.. offsets over end of total transfer size,
offset overlaps, data portion greater than total transfer length, transfer
tags which don't correspond with any in progress etc. What should an
initiator do when it decides that at target is behaving illegally?  For
example, what if a 512 byte write is sent and then we receive an RTT for
offset 2048?
We propose that the draft specifies to abort the write command and send a
response with the ISCSI status set to 1 ( iscsi check ).   Better yet -
since we have 8 bits of iSCSI status, why not have more values than just
"good" and "iscsi check" (e.g. not_logged_on, data_in_timeout,
buffer_address_inconsistency).  After seeing a couple consecutively it
should shut down the connection or better yet send the proposed "Out of
Sync" command described below.

Section: General
There's no framing of the headers and data on the buffers from TCP. If
anything goes wrong with the parsing, its difficult if not impossible to
recover. It only takes one length field to be 'off'. If this happens the
target will probably generate lots of "Opcode not understood" messages.
We
suggest one of two methods: 1) after seeing consecutive "Opcode not
understood" messages it should shut down the connection if this doesn't
solve the problem then reset the target, or 2)  When the target finds that
it is out of sync with the initiator ( on receipt of an "Opcode not
understood"), it will send a new iSCSI "Out of Sync" command to the
initiator.  The initiator will assume at the reception of the "Out of Sync"
command that all unacknowledged outstanding requests have been dropped.
The
initiator then sends the next command with the OOB (out of band) bit set,
and with the OOB offset pointing to the beginning of the iSCSI header.  The
target, after sending the "Out of Sync" command, should ignore every thing
on that connection and wait for the OOB data to re-sync again.  This
exchange could also work if sent from the initiator to the target.

Section 2.2.2: Ordering and iSCSI numbering
"The initiator and target are assumed to have three registers that define
the allocation mechanism - CmdRN, ExpCmdRN, MaxCmdRN....  The target and
initiator registers are supposed to uphold causal ordering." This indicates
that these registers guarantee ordered delivery of commands among multiple
TCP connections in a session.  However, the spec continues in the following
paragraphs with the following statement which seems to negate this: "iSCSI
targets are not required to use the numbering scheme for ordered delivery
even when they support multiple connections."
We believe that the draft should clarify the issue by either: 1) stating
that in-order delivery MUST be guaranteed, or 2)  limiting the use of the
above three registers only to indicate the command queue depth of the
target, and remove any mention of their role for in-order delivery.

Section 2.2.6:
What is the view used for?  Is it's intent so different customers get
different LUNs views (like FC zoning)?

Section: 3.1.1
The draft suggests that the payload to the SCSI response (opcode 0x41)
could
contain response data and sense data together. However, the description is
ambiguous in terms of explaining how to interpret any such data that
follows
the header - for instance if it contains both, which one comes first, could
there be a gap between them, are there alignment issues etc.  Should a
target's response or sense data be included in a SCSI data response buffer?
In any case, its seems more natural that an adapter would provide these
separately ( response data for inquiry, sense for check condition etc ).
So, in the interests of simplicity we suggest limiting the scsi response
messages to contain EITHER response data, OR sense data, but not both. We
know which because either the res_len or the sense_len will have a non zero
value.

Section: 3.10
There should a be a timeout interval for getting in all the data buffers
associated with a write and a read.  Incomplete data may hang around
indefinitely if the TCP session stays open.
We propose that the target needs to have a timeout for WRITE, and the
initiator needs to have a timeout for READ.  The spec should specify the
length of the timeout and what the recovery action is. One suggestion is a
timeout in the order of seconds, with the recovery action of closing the
TCP
connection, starting a new connection, and re-issuing the command.  The
time
out parameter could be passed in the Login Parameters field.

Section: 2.2.4
It states in section 2.2.4 that "an initiator may request, at login, to
send
immediate data of any size and a target may indicate the size of immediate
data blocks it is ready to accept in its response."  But the draft is
ambiguous as to how this size negotiation gets done.  Is it a text command
format?  If so what is the syntax?
We propose: "ImmediateData: MaxSize"   where MaxSize is the maximum size of
immediate data the target is willing to accept in bytes.

Section: 3.3
The SCSI Response message defines a field 'iSCSI Status'. The value 1 means
'iSCSI Check'. In some error cases the command is being rejected without
being sent to the scsi layer, because the iscsi target layer found a
problem. Section 3.3.4 of the draft states: "if the iscsi field is not 0
the
command status will indicate CHECK CONDITION".  But the Command Status
field
is supposed to be the SCSI status (section 3.3.3). If the command never
went
to the SCSI layer, then a specific value should not put in that field.

We propose in these cases to change iscsi_status to the condition (more
values than just "good" and "iscsi check" i.e. not_logged_on,
data_in_timeout, buffer_address_inconsistency), and command status to 0.
This informs the initiator the iscsi target layer had a problem with this
command and never passed it on to the SCSI layer, allowing an unambiguous
separation of SCSI-related error conditions from iSCSI ones.

Section: 3.11.3
This section states that if the key is not recognized, it should be
ignored.

How should malformed Text commands be handled?
It can be handled by: 1) ignore the command, 2) Send a response with no
keys, 3)  Close down the session, 4) error response (however this may
provide information to an attacker)

Section: 3.13.4
the login "parameters passed for a clear-text password authentication are:
Initiator:<domain-name>[/modifier]
Target:<domain-name>[/modifier]
Authenticator:open-sesame
Access-Id:value"
Access-Id is ambiguous?  How does it differ from the Initiator?  It is not
described in Appendix B.

Sections: 3.14.2, 3.11.3, and 3.12.3
A Text Command is sent because the Login Response indicated "additional
authentication required."  The login can now complete, and the target
should
send a Login Response indicating "accept login." Does the target have to
send a Text Response in addition to the Login Response?  The text response
description makes it sound like all text keys must be sent back to the
initiator, if they are accepted. This would only be the case for certain
keys (such as UseRTT), correct?

Section: 3.17
The map command is very ambiguous and needs further definition.  Does the
iSCSI initiator or target issue this command?

Sections 3.6-3.8
When an iSCSI target receives a Task Management command specifying "Target
Reset", the iSCSI target may send an Asynchronous Event to any initiators
connected to the target device.
What is the intended session shutdown sequence?  Does each initiator wait
for the target to close the TCP connection?  Does each initiator
immediately
close its TCP connection?  Are the initiators expected to wait for a
certain
amount of time prior to re-opening their TCP connections?  This area needs
more work.


General Proposal:
We propose that a flag be added to the SCSI Data PDU to indicate that a PDU
is the last one for the "current data transfer".  This is most useful when
the current data transfer is the data being sent in response to an RTT:
The
target knows not to expect any more data for that RTT when it sees the bit
set.  This simplifies the termination of the data transfer, particularly if
overlapping data requests are sent or the initiator fails to send all of
the
requested data.  The bit might also be useful for data transfers to the
initiator in response to a SCSI command, where the data transfer can be
terminated and checked without having to watch for a SCSI Response packet.
Finally, it may belong in the SCSI Command PDU (for immediate data) and
perhaps the SCSI Response PDU (if non-sense data can show up there) for
consistency of implementation.