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    Public key AuthMethod



    
    
    In Minneapolis I proposed to add the public key AuthMethod based on
    SPKM (public key implementation of GSS-API, RFC-2025). SPKM is really
    suitable (it gives the exact definition of tokens to be exchange in iSCSI
    text
    messages for public key authentication including optional certificates
    exchange, and MAC digest based on shared key generated by the
    exchange, that might be negotiated in the iSCSI login).
    
    However, there is a question mark about the status of RFC-2025. It is on
    standards truck at Proposed Standard level, but it is from 1996... I had
    a correspondence with the CAT-WG chair, and here are two citations:
    
    "I'm unaware, however, of any current plans for advancement of this
    document
    beyond Proposed and it hasn't been actively discussed within the WG for
    some
    time. I'm also unsure as to its number of existing implementations."
    
    "Nonetheless, I believe that it remains well suited as a specification for
    an
    X.509-based authentication mechanism.  I'm not aware of an alternative
    specification with comparable scope currently defined within an Internet
    standards-track RFC"
    
    (BTW, if you look at the version linked from the RFC pages, the
    "Status of this Memo" section states:
    "This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community..."
    however the same section in the version fetched from the RFC Editor-pages
    states:
    "This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
       Internet community..."
    the CAT-WG chair confirmed that the first copy is a mistake.)
    
    In anyway, can we (/ should we) rely on RFC that its plan for becoming a
    standard is not clear at all?
    
    Another option for the public key AuthMethod might be a reduced version
    of the TLS handshake (implemented in the iSCSI text messages, not using
    the TLS record layer).  This can provide authentication (with optional
    certificate exchange) and a shared secret that can be used for MAC
    digest according to the TLS MAC specification (but used of course as
    optional iSCSI digest and not inside TLS).
    
    I believe it's preferable to adopt an existing security standard as much
    as possible than inventing something new for iSCSI.
    
    I'd like to hear some opinions on these before we decide how to define
    the public key AuthMethod.
    
    Regards,
      Ofer
    
    
    Ofer Biran
    Storage and Systems Technology
    IBM Research Lab in Haifa
    biran@il.ibm.com  972-4-8296253
    
    
    


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Last updated: Tue Sep 04 01:05:11 2001
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