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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: iSCSI - Change - Login/Text commands with the binary stage co deStephen, That can happen as the target may set-up completely new TCP connections (the old sockets are still there and look OK). Untill the login is progessing he assumes that this is just another open-session attempt. Then he checks the old session and the session is dead (initiator has closed the connections). The target has to distinguish only between a session that is alive (and reject the new one) and one that its dead in which case it can clean-up. Julo "Wheat, Stephen R" <stephen.r.wheat@intel.com> on 23-08-2001 22:50:56 Please respond to "Wheat, Stephen R" <stephen.r.wheat@intel.com> To: Julian Satran/Haifa/IBM@IBMIL, ips@ece.cmu.edu cc: Subject: RE: iSCSI - Change - Login/Text commands with the binary stage co de Julian, I don't understand your answer. For the scenario given, I would presume then that the target would reject the new session attempt, as it sees the previous session still "alive". What is there to tell the target that this is any different from when the Initiator is erroneously using the repetitive session id? Thanks, Stephen -----Original Message----- From: Julian Satran [mailto:Julian_Satran@il.ibm.com] Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2001 11:15 AM To: ips@ece.cmu.edu Subject: Re: iSCSI - Change - Login/Text commands with the binary stage co de Stephen, 1.If the initiator goes away for a while and reboots and there was no activity on the connections the target may see a session alive (I am not sure that it has to appear on the state diagram but maybe). 2.Again - I am not sure that the curent state diagram includes death of the initiator Julo "Wheat, Stephen R" <stephen.r.wheat@intel.com>@ece.cmu.edu on 23-08-2001 19:58:34 Please respond to "Wheat, Stephen R" <stephen.r.wheat@intel.com> Sent by: owner-ips@ece.cmu.edu To: ips@ece.cmu.edu cc: Subject: Re: iSCSI - Change - Login/Text commands with the binary stage co de Julian, 1.3.6 ISID states that the target should check to see if the old session is still active when a duplicate session is detected. I have two questions, the second only if you answer in the affirmative on the first ;^) 1. Is there a properly executed sequence of events (i.e., no coding error on the target side) where the session is not active, but the target hadn't taken notice of it? It appears this as a protocol-specified means to work around a flaw in a target's implementation. I interpret the state diagram transitions as being atomic wrt other commands. I.e., the last logout would result in the various transitions of the connection/session prior to the initiator starting the session up again. And the target would have completed the transitions prior to handling a new session request. 2. If you answered (1) in the affirmative, then the word "Active" is not consistent with the 6.3 Session State Diagram. Does this mean the target got lost, due to transport failures of any sort, in its transition from Q3-to-Q2-to-Q1? It sounds like the intent is to close the old session if the session was in Q2 or Q4, presuming if it were in Q1, it would not have been found as a duplicate. Stephen
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